Great American Duck Races v. Kangaroo Manufacturing by District of Arizona
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 
 
 
Great American Duck Races Incorporated,
 
Plaintiff, 
 
v.  
 
Kangaroo Manufacturing Incorporated, et 
al., 
 
Defendants.
No. CV-17-00212-PHX-ROS
 
ORDER  
 
 
 As established at trial, ducks in nature are often yellow and usually have wings, 
bills, and tails.  But “[d]ucks do not naturally wear sunglasses in the wild.”  (Doc. 177 at 
27).  Both parties decided to try to improve on nature by manufacturing pool floats in the 
shape of ducks wearing sunglasses.  Plaintiff Great American Duck Races Inc. (“GAME”) 
owns copyrights and trademarks covering its depiction of a duck wearing sunglasses and 
GAME believes the pool float manufactured by Defendant Kangaroo Manufacturing Inc. 
(“Kangaroo”) infringed those copyrights and trademarks.  GAME also believes Kangaroo 
engaged in unfair competition.  Based on the evidence presented at the trial, all of GAME’s 
claims do not succeed. 
BACKGROUND 
 Many of the relevant facts were undisputed at trial but to the extent there were 
factual disagreements, the following represent the Court’s factual findings.  In 1988, Eric 
Schechter started GAME.  At the time, GAME was focused on conducting fundraising 
activities.  The fundraising concept was for individuals to “adopt” a small toy duck and 
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then all the ducks would “race” on a waterway, such as the Salt River Canal or in New 
York Harbor.  (Doc. 176 at 36).  The person who had adopted the duck that finished first 
would win “a new car [or] prizes,” which had been donated.  The sponsoring organization 
would then retain all the “adoption” fees.  (Doc. 176 at 35).  Hoping to prevent knockoffs, 
Schechter realized he needed to “brand” or make GAME’s races “unique.”  “[O]ne of the 
ways to do that was the duck itself.”  (Doc. 176 at 33).  Thus, Schechter and a few other 
individuals designed a unique plastic duck to use in the fundraising activities.  (Doc. 176 
at 27, 30).   
 Schechter and his collaborators designed a small duck from “scratch.”  (Doc. 176 at 
33).  GAME’s original duck was similar to the familiar Rubber Duckie of Sesame Street 
fame with one crucial alteration: sunglasses.  As explained by Schechter, the sunglasses 
served no functional purpose.  (Doc. 176 at 34).  Rather, the sunglasses were merely to 
differentiate GAME’s duck from other similar ducks already available in the market.   
 GAME experienced great success in its fundraising business.  In 2001, a major 
retailer approached GAME and asked “to take the duck and make it into some pool 
products.”  (Doc. 176 at 38).  That inquiry resulted in GAME producing a few products, 
such as a “pool-dispensing chlorinator” with the distinctive GAME duck on the top.  (Doc. 
176 at 40).  In 2012 or 2013, other retailers asked GAME to make a large inflatable in the 
shape of GAME’s duck.  (Doc. 176 at 61).  In 2015, GAME produced what it calls the 
“Giant Inflatable Derby Duck.”  That product was offered for sale in 2016 and it became 
an immediate hit.  (Doc. 176 at 66, 77-78).  
 The Giant Inflatable Derby Duck (“Derby Duck”), when inflated, measures 81 
inches long, 76 inches wide, and 44 inches tall.1  The Derby Duck is yellow and has a red 
bill, which is open.  The top of the Derby Duck’s head has a small crest.  The Derby Duck 
is wearing black sunglasses that are also inflatable, giving them a striking three-
dimensional appearance.  The Derby Duck has inflatable wings and an inflatable tail.2  The 
                                              
1 GAME made a smaller version of the duck as well but the parties have focused on the 
larger version. 
2 There appear to be two slightly different versions of GAME’s duck.  One version has 
inflatable feet.  (Doc. 1-1 at 17).  A second version, and the version presented at trial, does 
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Derby Duck is a “flatbed float” which means there is a flat surface where individuals can 
sit or lie down without touching the water.  (Doc. 176 at 110).   
 The Derby Duck is sold in a rectangular box.  On the front of that box is a picture 
of the Derby Duck in a swimming pool, with three people sitting on it and one standing 
next to it.  The name “Giant Inflatable Derby Duck” is written across the top of the front 
in blue letters on a white background.  The bottom of the box’s front has white writing on 
a blue background.  The other sides of the box also have blue backgrounds with white 
writing.  The back of the box is mostly white with blue writing.  The back also has a 
different picture, depicting a woman lying on the Derby Duck. 
 GAME has sold tens of thousands of its Derby Duck through numerous retailers.  
The Derby Duck has appeared in the press and in viral videos.  When purchasing the Derby 
Duck, consumers encounter either the product box or two-dimensional pictures.  
Consumers usually do not see the Derby Duck inflated prior to purchasing.  
 GAME owns various copyrights and trademarks involving a duck wearing 
sunglasses.  GAME uses its trademarks in selling “a wide variety of products and services” 
including the Derby Duck as well as “pool lights, chlorinators, and thermometers.”  (Doc. 
183 at 3).  One of GAME’s trademarks is: 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Doc. 1-1 at 12).  GAME has devoted considerable resources in promoting, advertising, 
and marketing its products and services using its trademarks. 
 The parties have stipulated the Derby Duck “is an original work of authorship 
                                              
not have inflatable feet. 
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protected under the Copyright Act.”  (Doc. 183 at 3).  GAME registered the Derby Duck 
with the United States Copyright Office and it is protected under Copyright Reg. No. 
VA0002004191.  That Copyright is titled “Giant Inflatable Derby Duck.”  A few years 
after the Derby Duck was first sold, competitors began to emerge.   
 Defendant Justin Ligeri was responsible for production of one of the Derby Duck’s 
competitors.  Ligeri is the owner of Defendants Kangaroo and Yagoozon, Inc.  (Doc. 176 
at 124).  Kangaroo was incorporated in 2014 and has offices in Tempe, Arizona.  (Doc. 
176 at 124).  It purportedly is in the business of manufacturing “toys [and] novelties for 
mass consumption.”  (Doc. 176 at 124).  It is unclear when Yagoozon was established but 
it was not a manufacturer.  Instead, Yagoozon was in the business of “selling products at 
retail that it bought from other manufacturers.”  (Doc. 176 at 125).  Yagoozon sold products 
exclusively on Amazon.com.3  (Doc. 176 at 124).  Neither Kangaroo nor Yagoozon 
engaged in normal corporate formalities, such as regular board meetings.  (Doc. 176 at 
127).  For present purposes, the Court will usually refer simply to Kangaroo when 
discussing the activities of Kangaroo and Yagoozon.   
 Ligeri and Kangaroo experienced substantial success selling products on Amazon.  
(Doc. 176 at 130).  At one point, Ligeri offered live seminars to teach other individuals 
how to successfully sell products on Amazon.  In advertising those seminars, Ligeri very 
confidently appeared in a video where he presented his business model.  What he would 
enlighten others to do was to “create a product for Amazon that people are looking for 
already.”  (Doc. 176 at 137).  At trial, Ligeri explained that statement meant he instructed 
people to “to look for what people are searching for . . . and then improve upon what the 
marketplace is offering.”  (Doc. 176 at 139-40).  In practice, it was clear that Ligeri and his 
companies would identify successful products on Amazon and then make slightly different 
versions of those products without apparent concern about possible intellectual property 
violations.  That design process was described in detail at trial. 
  According to Bernard Oliver, Kangaroo’s product designer, he received design 
                                              
3 In 2018, Yagoozon filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy.  (Doc. 120).  The Bankruptcy Court 
lifted the automatic stay to allow this case to proceed.  (Doc. 144). 
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instructions from David Follett, Kangaroo’s Executive Director.  (Doc. 177 at 125).  Follett 
would “come in with a product that was already in the field, and he would say: This is a 
product we are going to produce under Kangaroo.”  (Oliver Deposition at 28).  Follett did 
not instruct Oliver to copy the product in its entirety.  Instead, Follett would hand Oliver 
the “product and say: We want to make something like this, bigger, brighter.  It has got to 
be better, but basically, this is the product we are making.”  (Id. at 37).  In other words, the 
Kangaroo product was meant to be “bigger and better” but it was meant to “look in [the 
same] realm” as the existing products.  (Id. at 74).  When asked whether Kangaroo 
investigated intellectual property rights before producing its products, Oliver stated he was 
“not really part of . . . those types of discussions.”  In addition, Oliver did not have time to 
investigate intellectual property rights because Kangaroo was operated “like a sweatshop” 
where he “worked all day” and only left when he was “exhausted.”  (Id. at 39). 
 In late 2015 or early 2016, Follett decided Kangaroo should manufacture “novelty 
pool floats.”  (Doc. 176 at 147).  Follett looked at the available pool floats and discovered 
four duck pool floats sold by four different companies.  (Doc. 176 at 148).  Follett provided 
the other companies’ products to Oliver and instructed Oliver to “create the design of a 
pool float in the form of a yellow duck with sunglasses [but] make it different from the 
yellow duck pool floats” already on the market.  (Doc. 176 at 148).  Oliver designed the 
new pool float and Kangaroo manufactured its own duck-wearing-sunglasses pool float.  
In other words, Oliver had the Derby Duck when designing Kangaroo’s duck and, to some 
extent, modeled Kangaroo’s duck after the Derby Duck.  Oliver did not, however, slavishly 
copy the Derby Duck.  Thus, while there are some similarities, there are also significant 
differences. 
 Kangaroo’s duck is about one-third the size of the Derby Duck.  (Doc. 176 at 108).  
When inflated, Kangaroo’s duck is 49 inches long, 45 inches wide, and 32 inches tall.  That 
size means Kangaroo’s duck can only accommodate one person.  Kangaroo’s duck is 
yellow with a closed orange bill.  Unlike the Derby Duck, Kangaroo’s duck is a ring instead 
of a flat surface.  Also, Kangaroo’s duck has wings and a tail that are drawn on instead of 
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being inflatable like the Derby Duck.  Like the Derby Duck, however, Kangaroo’s duck 
has a small crest on its head and is wearing sunglasses.  But the sunglasses on Kangaroo’s 
duck are not completely black and they are not inflatable.  Instead, the sunglasses are drawn 
on and have partially grey lenses and partially grey temples. 
 Kangaroo sold its duck in a rectangular box.  The cover of Kangaroo’s box is 
dominated by a picture of a young woman sitting on the duck.  The cover consists of a blue 
and white background, with bubbles in the blue portions to evoke water.  In the upper left 
of the box is writing in mostly black lettering stating “‘HUGE’ 49” Yellow Duck Pool 
Float.”  The back of the box contains a picture of the duck.  The sides of the box are also 
blue and white with a picture of Kangaroo’s duck along with the same lettering stating 
“‘HUGE’ 49” Yellow Duck Pool Float.”   
 When asked why Kangaroo decided to put sunglasses on its duck, Follett explained 
that “[s]unglasses are cool” and because “[p]eople wear sunglasses at the beach.”  (Doc. 
177 at 131).  Kangaroo manufactures other floats depicting animals wearing sunglasses, 
such as a flamingo.  (Doc. 177 at 131).  Kangaroo also manufactures a duck float that does 
not have sunglasses.  (Doc. 177 at 132). 
 Sometime in 2016, Kangaroo and Yagoozon began selling their duck-wearing-
sunglasses float on Amazon.  However, GAME was not able to present evidence 
establishing how Kangaroo’s duck was listed on Amazon because the information was 
destroyed or was otherwise unavailable.  Thus, it is unknown whether Kangaroo’s Amazon 
listing included a picture of the box or merely displayed pictures of the duck.  It is also 
unknown how prominently Kangaroo identified itself in the listing.  For example, the 
listing might have emphasized the source of the duck was Kangaroo or the listing might 
not have indicated a source.  In short, the Court has no material and admissible evidence 
of how Kangaroo marketed its duck or how consumers encountered the Kangaroo duck.   
 Around January 2017, GAME saw Kangaroo’s duck listed for sale on Amazon.  
GAME complained to Amazon and Amazon immediately removed the listing.  GAME also 
wrote to Kangaroo and claimed Kangaroo had “been selling a strikingly similar, knock-off 
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version” of the Derby Duck.  According to GAME, Kangaroo’s duck had “virtually the 
same appearance as” the Derby Duck.  GAME requested Kangaroo “immediately stop all 
sales and distribution” of its duck.  It is unclear whether Kangaroo responded to that letter 
but GAME filed the present suit a few days later.  There was no evidence at trial that 
Kangaroo continued to sell its duck.   
ANALYSIS 
 Pursuant to the operative complaint, GAME believes Kangaroo’s duck infringes its 
copyright for the Derby Duck.  GAME also believes Kangaroo has committed trademark 
infringement as well as federal and common law unfair competition.  Prior to trial, GAME 
dismissed its claims for monetary relief.  (Doc. 151).  Accordingly, the only remaining 
issues are Kangaroo’s liability and, if liability exists, whether GAME is entitled to a 
permanent injunction forbidding Kangaroo from marketing and selling its duck.   
I. Copyright Infringement 
 To prevail on its copyright infringement action, GAME needed to prove two things: 
(1) that it owns a valid copyright in the Derby Duck and (2) Defendants copied protected 
elements of the Derby Duck.  Rentmeester v. Nike, Inc., 883 F.3d 1111, 1116 (9th Cir. 
2018).  The parties stipulated that GAME owns a valid copyright, leaving only the second 
element at issue. 
 As recently explained by the Ninth Circuit, “the second element has two distinct 
components: ‘copying’ and ‘unlawful appropriation.’”  Id. at 1117.  “Proof of copying by 
the defendant is necessary because independent creation is a complete defense to copyright 
infringement.”  Id.  And “[p]roof of unlawful appropriation . . .  is necessary because 
copyright law does not forbid all copying.”  Id.  Among other limitations, copyright law 
does not prohibit the copying of “‘ideas’ or ‘concepts’ used in the plaintiff’s work.”  Id.  
Rather, copyright law only prohibits copying “the plaintiff’s expression of those ideas or 
concepts to render the two works ‘substantially similar.’”  Id.   
A. Copying  
 The evidence at trial established Kangaroo “copied” the Derby Duck when 
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designing its own duck.  A Kangaroo employee reviewed the Derby Duck and instructed 
another employee to make a different version for Kangaroo to manufacture.  (Doc. 176 at 
148).  That evidence is sufficient to satisfy the “copying” requirement.  Contrary to 
GAME’s position at trial and during post-trial argument, the fact that Kangaroo copied the 
Derby Duck does not establish liability.  Even once GAME established “copying,” it still 
had to prove “unlawful appropriation.”    
B. Unlawful Appropriation 
 “To prove unlawful appropriation . . . the similarities between the two works must 
be “‘substantial’ and they must involve protected elements of the plaintiff’s work.”  
Rentmeester v. Nike, Inc., 883 F.3d 1111, 1117 (9th Cir. 2018).  This requires “a two-part 
analysis consisting of the ‘extrinsic test’ and the ‘intrinsic test.’”  Id. at 1118.  To prevail, 
GAME had to “prove substantial similarity under both tests.”  Id. 
 “The extrinsic test assesses the objective similarities of the two works, focusing only 
on the protectable elements of the plaintiff’s expression.”  Id.  In conducting this test, the 
Court must “‘filter out’ the unprotectable elements of the plaintiff’s work” and then 
compare the protectable elements in the plaintiff’s work with the “corresponding elements 
of the defendant’s work to assess similarities in the objective details of the works.”  Id.  
The unprotectable elements are “ideas and concepts, material in the public domain, and . . . 
stock or standard features that are commonly associated with the treatment of a given 
subject.”  Id.  See also Folkens v. Wyland Worldwide, LLC, 882 F.3d 768, 774 (9th Cir. 
2018) (noting “[b]ecause the requirement is one of substantial similarity to protected 
elements of the copyrighted work, it is essential to distinguish between the protected and 
unprotected material in a plaintiff’s work”); Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entm’t, Inc., 616 F.3d 
904, 917 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The key question always is: Are the works substantially similar 
beyond the fact that they depict the same idea?”); Benay v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, 607 F.3d 
620, 624 (9th Cir. 2010) (“A court must take care to inquire only whether the protect[able] 
elements, standing alone, are substantially similar.”).   
 The Ninth Circuit addressed this “filtering out” process in some detail in a case 
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involving glass-in-glass jellyfish sculptures.  There, the Ninth Circuit held “no copyright 
protection may be afforded to the idea of producing a glass-in-glass jellyfish sculpture or 
to elements of expression that naturally follow from the idea of such a sculpture.”  Satava 
v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805, 810 (9th Cir. 2003).  That meant the copyright holder could not 
“prevent others from depicting jellyfish with tendril-like tentacles or rounded bells, 
because many jellyfish possess those body parts.”  Id. at 811.  The copyright holder also 
could not “prevent others from depicting jellyfish in bright colors, because many jellyfish 
are brightly colored,” and he could not “prevent others from depicting jellyfish swimming 
vertically, because jellyfish swim vertically in nature and often are depicted swimming 
vertically.”  Id.  Having filtered out what was not protectable, the Ninth Circuit concluded 
the copyright holder could only prevent others from copying “the distinctive curls of 
particular tendrils; the arrangement of certain hues; [and] the unique shape of jellyfishes’ 
bells” provided those attributes “were not governed by jellyfish physiology or the glass-in-
glass medium.”  Id. at 812. 
 In the present case, GAME’s copyright cannot prevent others from depicting yellow 
ducks, with a bill, wings, a tail, and a crest on the head.  All of those attributes are found 
on ducks in nature.  Moreover, the general design and coloring of the duck has become a 
“stock or standard feature[].”  Rentmeester v. Nike, Inc., 883 F.3d 1111, 1118 (9th Cir. 
2018).  As noted earlier, the GAME duck resembles the Rubber Duckie from Sesame Street 
and many other examples.4  Therefore, there are very few protectable elements in the Derby 
Duck.  The parties have focused on the addition of sunglasses as the crucial protectable 
element.  And the Court agrees that the sunglasses are the key protectable element of the 
Derby Duck.  But even there, GAME’s copyright provides no protection to the idea of a 
duck float wearing sunglasses.  Rather, GAME’s copyright only protects the particular 
                                              
4 See, e.g., https://www.cnn.com/travel/article/hong-kong-giant-duck/index.html 
(describing “great big yellow duck” that has “taken up temporary residence in cities all 
over the world”). The fact that a large floating yellow duck visited cities across the world 
is something that can be “accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy 
cannot reasonably be questioned.”  Fed. R. Evid. 201.  See Ritter v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 
58 F.3d 454, 458 (9th Cir. 1995) (concluding it was not an abuse of discretion to take 
judicial notice of newspaper articles).   
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expression of that idea.  See Bikram’s Yoga Coll. of India, L.P. v. Evolation Yoga, LLC, 
803 F.3d 1032, 1037 (9th Cir. 2015) (noting copyright law provides no protection to an 
“idea” but only to a particular “expression”).  That is, GAME is entitled to protection only 
for the way it expressed the idea of a duck wearing sunglasses.   
 Having identified the protectable element, there is “no hard-and-fast rule” that 
dictates whether Kangaroo’s expression of the sunglasses-on-a-duck idea is substantially 
similar to the expression of that idea in the Derby Duck.  Rentmeester v. Nike, Inc., 883 
F.3d 1111, 1121 (9th Cir. 2018).  Instead, the Court’s task is to determine whether the two 
expressions of the sunglasses-on-a-duck idea are so similar that “the ordinary observer, 
unless he set out to detect the disparities, would be disposed to overlook them.”  Id.  
 When confronted with the two ducks, and focusing on the sunglasses, there are a 
few striking differences.  The sunglasses on the Derby Duck consist of a double bridge, are 
solid black, and most importantly are separately inflatable.  The fact that the sunglasses are 
inflatable make the sunglasses a very prominent feature of the Derby Duck.  By contrast, 
the sunglasses on the Kangaroo duck have a single bridge, are not solid black, and are 
merely painted on the duck’s head.  An “ordinary observer” confronted with the two works 
and focusing on the sunglasses would not be “disposed to overlook” these differences.  
Rentmeester, 883 F.3d at 1122.  While the Derby Duck and Kangaroo’s duck undoubtedly 
share the general idea or concept of a duck wearing sunglasses, GAME “cannot claim an 
exclusive right to ideas or concepts at that level of generality.”  Id.              
 The similarity of the protectable elements is not enough for GAME to pass the 
extrinsic test.  Therefore, the Court need not continue and conduct the intrinsic test.  But 
even if GAME had passed the extrinsic test, its copyright claim would fail.  The intrinsic 
test requires the Court conduct “a more holistic, subjective comparison of the works to 
determine whether they are substantially similar in ‘total concept and feel.’”  Rentmeester, 
883 F.3d at 1118.  The two ducks do not meet this test.   
 The parties’ ducks are very different when compared with any care.  The Derby 
Duck has a red bill that is open.  Kangaroo’s duck has an orange bill that is closed.  The 
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Derby Duck is a flat float while Kangaroo’s duck is a ring float.  Finally, the Derby Duck’s 
sunglasses are all black and exceptionally prominent.  The Kangaroo duck’s sunglasses are 
only partially black and not especially prominent.  In short, the “total concept and feel” of 
the two ducks preclude a finding of liability on the copyright claim. 
 II.  Trademark Infringement 
 For GAME to prevail on its trademark claim, it had to prove Kangaroo used marks 
that were “likely to cause consumer confusion.”  Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced 
Sys. Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 1137, 1144 (9th Cir. 2011) (federal trademark law requires 
likelihood of consumer confusion).  That requires assessing “whether a ‘reasonably prudent 
consumer’ in the marketplace is likely to be confused as to the origin of the good or service 
bearing one of the marks.”  Dreamwerks Prod. Grp., Inc. v. SKG Studio, 142 F.3d 1127, 
1129 (9th Cir. 1998).  This requires the confusion “be probable, not simply a possibility.”  
Murray v. Cable NBC, 86 F.3d 858, 861 (9th Cir. 1996).  Here, the relevant inquiry is 
whether a reasonable consumer seeing Kangaroo’s marks5 would mistakenly conclude 
GAME had some association with that product. 
 The Ninth Circuit requires courts deploy an eight-factor test to guide the likelihood 
of confusion analysis.  AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979).  
The eight factors are: (1) strength of the mark; (2) proximity or relatedness of the goods; 
(3) similarity of the marks; (4) evidence of actual confusion; (5) marketing channels used; 
(6) degree of care customers are likely to exercise in purchasing the goods; (7) defendants’ 
intent in selecting the mark; and (8) likelihood of expansion into other markets.  The Ninth 
Circuit has repeatedly stressed these eight factors should be viewed as providing a general 
framework for determining the relevant question.  Thus, applying the eight factors “is not 
like counting beans.”  One Indus., LLC v. Jim O’Neal Distrib., Inc., 578 F.3d 1154, 1162 
(9th Cir. 2009).  And while some of the “factors are much more important than others . . . 
the relative importance of each individual factor [is] case-specific.”  Brookfield Comm’ns, 
Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1054 (9th Cir. 1999).  See also Multi Time 
                                              
5 GAME states the “marks” used by Kangaroo were pictures of Kangaroo’s own duck and 
the duck itself. 
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Machine, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 804 F.3d 930, 936 (9th Cir. 2015) (noting the eight 
factors “are not exhaustive and other variables may come into play depending on the 
particular facts presented”); Entrepreneur Media, Inc. v. Smith, 279 F.3d 1135, 1141 (9th 
Cir. 2002) (noting court must not “mechanically” consider the eight factors). 
A. Strength of the Mark 
 The first factor is the strength of the mark.  “The scope of the trademark protection 
that [courts] give marks depends upon the strength of the mark, with stronger marks 
receiving greater protection than weak ones.”  Entrepreneur, 279 F.3d at 1141.  “This 
‘strength’ of the trademark is evaluated in terms of its conceptual strength and commercial 
strength.”  GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 1207 (9th Cir. 2000).  
Assessing “conceptual strength” requires locating the trademark on the “spectrum of 
increasing inherent distinctiveness.”  Id.  And assessing “commercial strength” requires 
determining “the strength of the mark in the marketplace.”  One Indus., LLC v. Jim O’Neal 
Distrib., Inc., 578 F.3d 1154, 1164 (9th Cir. 2009).   
i. Conceptual Strength 
 “A mark’s conceptual strength depends largely on the obviousness of its connection 
to the good or service to which it refers.”  JL Beverage Co., LLC v. Jim Beam Brands Co., 
828 F.3d 1098, 1107 (9th Cir. 2016).  The Ninth Circuit determines conceptual strength by 
“classify[ing] [the] mark along a spectrum of five categories ranging from strongest to 
weakest: arbitrary, fanciful, suggestive, descriptive, and generic.”  Id.  See also E. & J. 
Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280, 1291 (9th Cir. 1992).  Marks “with no 
commonly understood connection to the product” are considered “arbitrary” or “fanciful” 
and “trigger the highest degree of trademark protection.”  Jim Beam, 828 F.3d at 1107.  
Suggestive marks, which are entitled to a lower degree of protection, are those “which 
suggest a product’s features and require consumers to exercise some imagination to 
associate the suggestive mark with the product.”  Id.  Finally, “descriptive” marks are those 
that “define a particular characteristic of the product in a way that does not require any 
imagination” while “generic” marks are those that “describe the product in its entirety.”  
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Id.  Unfortunately, identifying the exact boundaries of these categories is difficult because 
“[c]ategorizing trademarks is necessarily an imperfect science.”  Fortune Dynamic, Inc. v. 
Victoria’s Secret Stores Brand Mgmt., Inc., 618 F.3d 1025, 1033 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 The Ninth Circuit’s guidance for determining the “conceptual strength” of 
trademarks consisting solely of images is not clear.  In one case, the trademark at issue was 
a pair of lips for a company that made vodka.  The Ninth Circuit held there was “no 
commonly understood connection” between lips and “the alcohol product it represents.”  
Jim Beam, 828 F.3d at 1108.  Thus, in that case, a jury could reasonably conclude the lips 
were “arbitrary” and entitled to “the highest degree of trademark protection.”  Id.  Here, 
GAME’s trademarks fall into the “descriptive” or “generic” category.  The trademarks are 
just stylized versions of the underlying products.  A consumer does not need to exercise 
any imagination to associate the mark with GAME’s products.  Thus, GAME’s marks have 
relatively little conceptual strength. 
ii. Commercial Strength 
Moving beyond the marks’ “conceptual strength,” the other issue in determining 
strength is a mark’s “commercial strength.”  That requires taking “into account a mark’s 
actual marketplace recognition.”  Fortune Dynamic, Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores Brand 
Mgmt., Inc., 618 F.3d 1025, 1034 (9th Cir. 2010).  While evidence of actual consumer 
recognition likely would be best, marketplace recognition can also be established through 
evidence of “extensive advertising, length of exclusive use,” and a large amount of sales.  
Accuride Int’l, Inc. v. Accuride Corp., 871 F.2d 1531, 1536 (9th Cir. 1989) (noting 
“descriptive or suggestive mark may be strengthened” through advertising etc.). 
Here, there was no evidence offered that consumers associate GAME’s marks with 
GAME.  But there was evidence that GAME has used its trademarks in advertising and 
had a substantial amount of sales.  That advertising and sales mean GAME’s marks have 
some “commercial strength” but the absence of any indication that consumers recognize 
the mark undercuts that strength to a significant degree. 
On balance, the lack of conceptual strength and the absence of any meaningful 
evidence of consumer recognition (i.e., limited commercial strength) means the “strength 
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of the mark” factor weighs in favor of Kangaroo.   
B. Relatedness of the Goods 
 The second factor is the “relatedness of the goods.”  When two entities provide 
similar goods, there may be a greater likelihood of confusion because consumers might 
“mistakenly assume there is an association between” the two entities.  Network 
Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Sys. Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 1137, 1150 (9th Cir. 2011).  
Alternatively, “the proximity of goods [might] become less important if advertisements are 
clearly labeled or consumers exercise a high degree of care, because rather than being 
misled, the consumer would merely be confronted with choices among similar products.”  
Id.  In other words, the fact that entities provide similar services can support or weaken the 
likelihood of confusion, depending on the context. 
 Here, the two ducks are direct competitors but GAME did not preserve the Amazon 
listing of Kangaroo’s product.  Accordingly, the Court could not determine whether 
Kangaroo prominently identified itself in that listing.  The boxes, however, did clearly 
identify each company.  Thus, while the products are related, there is insufficient evidence 
to determine whether the manner in which the products were presented or advertised would 
have caused consumers to assume there was an association between GAME and Kangaroo.  
This factor is neutral.   
C. Similarity of the Marks 
The third factor is similarity of the marks.  The Ninth Circuit has instructed that 
“[s]imilarity is best adjudged by appearance, sound, and meaning.”  Fortune Dynamic, Inc. 
v. Victoria’s Secret Stores Brand Mgmt., Inc., 618 F.3d 1025, 1032 (9th Cir. 2010).  
Crucially, however, a court must also take into account how the marks “appear in the 
marketplace.”  Id.  As explained at post-trial arguments, GAME believes the relevant 
comparison is between the pictures on Kangaroo’s box to GAME’s marks.  The pictures 
and marks, however, have some distinct differences.  For example, the sunglasses on the 
marks and the sunglasses on Kangaroo’s float were different in shape.  In addition, the 
overall shape of the mark compared to the shape of Kangaroo’s ring float were also 
different.  It is true, however, that both Kangaroo’s box and GAME’s marks are ducks 
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wearing sunglasses.  Thus, the marks have some similarity, although the Court is not 
convinced because specific evidence was not offered that, when encountered in the 
marketplace, consumers would associate the pictures on Kangaroo’s box with the 
trademarks used by GAME.  This factor weighs slightly in favor of GAME.  
D. Evidence of Actual Confusion 
 The fourth factor involves evidence of actual consumer confusion.  GAME 
presented no evidence of actual confusion.  Thus, this factor weighs in favor of Kangaroo. 
E. Marketing Channels Used 
 The fifth factor requires looking to the marketing channels used by GAME and 
Kangaroo.  In general, two entities using the same marketing channels increases the 
likelihood of confusion.  Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Sys. Concepts, Inc., 638 
F.3d 1137, 1151 (9th Cir. 2011).  This factor is most helpful when the two entities belong 
to a niche market and advertise in specialized outlets, such as trade magazines.  Id.  But 
this factor “does not shed much light on the likelihood of consumer confusion” when the 
two entities use standard channels, such as television, radio, and the Internet.  Id.  Both 
GAME and Kangaroo used Amazon to market their products.  Given the breadth of 
products available on Amazon, it cannot be deemed a specialized outlet.  And there is no 
other evidence of Kangaroo’s marketing.  This factor, therefore, does not weigh strongly 
in either party’s favor. 
F. Degree of Care 
The sixth factor requires assessing the nature of the goods or services and the type 
of consumer who would be interested in those goods or services.  Generally, consumers 
are expected to proceed with more care if the goods or services are specialized or of 
uncommon importance.  For example, “highly specialized professional purchasers” 
responsible for the purchase of drawer mechanisms were “expected to exercise a high 
degree of care.”  Accuride Int’l, Inc. v. Accuride Corp., 871 F.2d 1531, 1537 (9th Cir. 
1989).  Consumers making impulsive purchasing decisions, however, are not expected to 
exercise much care.  Nova Wines, Inc. v. Adler Fels Winery LLC, 467 F. Supp. 2d 965, 981 
(N.D. Cal. 2006). 
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The parties’ experts disagreed on the amount of care consumers would exercise 
when purchasing an inflatable duck.  But given the low cost and simplicity of the ducks, 
the Court concludes consumers exercised a relatively low amount of care.  This factor, 
therefore, supports GAME. 
G. Kangaroo’s Intent 
 The seventh factor requires determining why Kangaroo started using the allegedly 
infringing mark.  “When one party knowingly adopts a mark similar to another’s, reviewing 
courts presume that the defendant will accomplish its purpose, and that the public will be 
deceived.”  Acad. of Motion Picture Arts & Scis. v. Creative House Promotions, Inc., 944 
F.2d 1446, 1456 (9th Cir. 1991).  From the testimony and video of Mr. Ligeri, there is no 
question that Kangaroo set out to compete with GAME.  But there’s also no question that 
Kangaroo made some visible changes to its duck in an apparent attempt to avoid copyright 
infringement.  In the end, however, Kangaroo knowingly used marks similar to GAME’s 
in an attempt to capitalize on what was already popular.  This factor supports GAME.     
H. Likelihood of Expansion 
 The final factor involves the likelihood that Kangaroo will expand its business to 
compete with GAME.  Because the products are already direct competitors, this factor is 
irrelevant. 
I. Summary  
 Looking to the factors together, some support GAME, some support Kangaroo, and 
some are neutral.  GAME can rely on: 
 similarity of the marks (but limited by the fact that Kangaroo’s product is different 
and was portrayed differently); 
 degree of care customers exercise; and  
 Kangaroo’s clear intent in selecting the mark (but diminished by the fact that 
Kangaroo placed the Kangaroo name on the packaging which was visible). 
Kangaroo can rely on: 
 the strength of the mark (has little conceptual strength and relatively little evidence 
of commercial strength); 
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 no evidence of actual confusion. 
And three factors are neutral: relatedness of the goods, marketing channels, and likelihood 
of expansion into other markets.   
 Even though more factors support GAME than Kangaroo, evaluating the factors as 
a whole, and in light of all the other evidence, GAME has not established a probability of 
confusion.  To be sure, there is some “possibility” of confusion.  But that is not enough.  
Murray v. Cable NBC, 86 F.3d 858, 861 (9th Cir. 1996).  The products and their boxes are 
sufficiently different such that consumers would not be confused into concluding 
Kangaroo’s product were manufactured by GAME.  The trademark infringement claim 
fails.   
 III.  Unfair Competition 
 At trial and in post-trial briefing, GAME did not focus on its separate claims for 
federal and state unfair competition.  For purposes of the federal claim, GAME argued the 
test for a federal “unfair competition claim is exactly the same as for a trademark 
infringement claim—whether there is a likelihood of confusion between the two marks.”  
(Doc. 182 at 12).  Because the trademark infringement claim fails, so does the federal unfair 
competition claim. 
 As for its state unfair competition claim, GAME’s argument during and after trial 
was that “a plaintiff must prove that a defendant engaged in conduct amounting to ‘passing 
off’ or ‘palming off’ by expressly or impliedly representing its product as a product from 
plaintiff.”  (Doc. 182 at 13).  But GAME then argued “the touchstone under Arizona is 
‘whether the public is likely to be confused’ by the defendant’s conduct” and referenced 
its arguments regarding trademark infringement.  (Doc. 182 at 13).  Thus, during the trial 
and post-trial briefing, GAME appeared to believe its state unfair competition claim would 
also fail if its trademark infringement claim failed. 
 During post-trial argument, however, GAME changed its approach by stressing 
Arizona’s unfair competition law is “exceptionally broad” and is meant to target a “wide 
variety of anti-competitive behavior.”  GAME then pointed to clear “evidence of copying 
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[and Kangaroo’s] practice of copying other products” as establishing “the way [Kangaroo] 
did business.”  GAME appears to believe there is a general unfairness in the way Kangaroo 
designed and manufactured its duck such that Kangaroo committed unfair competition.   
 Under Arizona law, “the ultimate question” for unfair competition “is always 
whether trade is being unfairly diverted, and whether the public is being cheated into the 
purchase of something which it is not in fact getting; the courts interfere solely to prevent 
deception.”  Skydive Arizona, Inc. v. Hogue, 360 P.3d 153, 162 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2015).  The 
fact that Kangaroo determined what products were popular and then made different 
versions of those products does not, on its own, establish trade was “unfairly diverted” 
from GAME to Kangaroo.  Though there was evidence of Kangaroo’s clear intent to 
capitalize on the popularity of the Derby Duck, the Court would need evidence of how the 
public was being cheated or deceived to conclude Kangaroo’s competitive behavior was 
improper.  After all, Arizona’s unfair competition doctrine is not meant to prevent all 
competition.  As noted in the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, “[t]he freedom 
to engage in business and to compete for the patronage of prospective customers is a 
fundamental premise of the free enterprise system.”  § 1 (1995) (comments).  And a seller 
is free “to seek to divert business not only from competitors generally, but also from a 
particular competitor.”  Id.  GAME has not offered any authority that merely producing a 
product similar to an existing product is sufficient to support a finding of unfair 
competition.        
 Unfortunately for GAME, the Court does not have the Amazon listing of 
Kangaroo’s duck float.  That would be the most critical evidence for assessing Kangaroo’s 
conduct.  If Kangaroo had designed that listing to capitalize on GAME’s own success, 
GAME might well be entitled to relief.  For example, if the Amazon listing made 
representations that the two floats were manufactured by the same company or if the 
Amazon listing contained pictures of the Derby Duck but Kangaroo then delivered its own 
duck, GAME’s unfair competition claim would be on much stronger ground.  But with no 
evidence of how the public encountered Kangaroo’s duck or what Kangaroo did in its 
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marketing efforts, the Court does not have a sufficient evidentiary basis to conclude 
Kangaroo did anything wrong. 
 IV.  Summary 
 GAME has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendants 
committed copyright infringement, trademark infringement, or unfair competition under 
federal or Arizona law.  Kangaroo asserted counterclaims for declaratory judgment but, as 
admitted in the Joint Proposed Pretrial Order, those counterclaims are mirror images of 
GAME’s affirmative claims for relief.  (Doc. 146 at 10).  Therefore, the Court will dismiss 
the counterclaims.  See Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Pub., 512 F.3d 522, 533 (9th Cir. 
2008) (“Federal courts do not have a duty to grant declaratory judgment; therefore, it is 
within a district court’s discretion to dismiss an action for declaratory judgment.”).  
 Accordingly, 
 IT IS ORDERED Defendants’ counterclaims are DISMISSED WITHOUT 
PREJUDICE. 
 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED the Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in 
favor of Defendants and close this case.  
 Dated this 17th day of July, 2019. 
 
 
Honorable Roslyn O. Silver
Senior United States District Judge
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